

EVALUATION DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM IN INDONESIA WITH SWOT ANALYSIS TO PREVENT TERRORIST RECIDIVISM

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Abstract: *The terrorist recidivism in Indonesia has increased after Isnaini Ramdhoni, who had just been on parole for two months, were re-involved in the suicide bomb attack in Surabaya. Deradicalization if carried out by the right person, the right method, the right material, adequate equipment and sufficient funds should not occur terrorist recidivism. So that terrorist recidivism does not happen again, the important thing to do is to evaluate the de-radicalization program that has been carried out so far. SWOT analysis is a method that can be used to evaluate the implementation of de-radicalization policies in Indonesia. Important findings in this study are first, the strength of Indonesia in implementing de-radicalization is the increasing role of government and society. Second, the weakness is the lack of good collaboration between the implementers of deradicalization. The opportunity is to support foreign aid to Indonesia in handling terrorism. Fourth, the globalization of jihad is still a real threat. Terrorist recidivism can be prevented by sustainable deradicalization through increased man, methods, materials, machine and money.*

Keywords: Deradicalization, Indonesia, Terrorist Recidivism, SWOT

Research Area: Social Science

Paper Type: Research Paper

1. INTRODUCTION

According to the Detachment 88 INP Director of Identification and Socialization on the discovery of 52 terrorist recidivists among 1.600 people who were arrested (Shodiq, 2018). Further detachment is developed when cross-comparing the two expressions with the divulgence by National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) on the counted number of terrorist recidivists is reported to be a meagre digit of three persons, under the precept of terrorist recidivists are defined as terrorist inmates who had received deradicalization correctional programs from BNPT - the calculation thus does not include the number of inmates who have never received such form of punishment (Idris, 2018).

This paper deliberately takes the phenomenon of recidivism as an entry point to showcase the importance of evaluation on the deradicalization program in Indonesia, thus acknowledging the academic position of this paper. Further discourse on the issue of recidivism in Indonesia is therefore preceded by a prompt introduction to general recidivism in the criminal justice context, in order to emphasize the interconnectivity between the two notions.

The issue of terrorist recidivism was brought up to the Indonesian public spotlight in 2019 as Isnaini Ramdhoni, who was under parole from BNPT in Sentul, Bogor, West Java, had been involved in bombing acts carried out by several families in Surabaya and Sidoarjo (Shodiq, 2019). The fact served as a counterargument to the idea that terrorist recidivism only

originated from inmates who had never participated in a deradicalization program conducted by BNPT during their sentence (Idris, 2018).

The current quality of correctional measures on terrorism inmates is further questioned as to the lack of penal officers' knowledge and understanding of how deradicalization program as a form of correction is done is discovered through research done by Istiomah (Istiomah, 2011). Furthermore, most academic researches on the effectiveness of correctional programs reported that the measurement of effectiveness is fundamentally constructed on the recidivism rate, which is prone to exploitation either in individual or organized level, and additionally suggested the conduct of micro-level analysis as an alternative method of analysis (Rom, 2013).

Research by Horgan dan Mary, for instance, stated that a former terrorist inmate who was sentenced in Guantanamo, and consequently underwent a correctional deradicalization program in Saudi Arabia attempted suicide bombing to one of the Saudi Arabian crown princes (Horgan and Mary, 2012). It was further discussed that the deradicalization program in Saudi Arabia was considered advanced at that time, however, the effectiveness in practice was still short of its reputation.

Another concern was raised by Somalia, with the unknown number of former inmates who rejoined the Al Shabaab terrorist group despite having experienced rehabilitative programs in the government-run correctional facility in Serendi. The inquiry on the credibility of instruments used to measure the effectiveness of the rehabilitative program is therefore raised - it was not until recently that the disclosure on how the correctional officers in Serendi possessed minimal experience in handling high-threat terrorist inmates, or how the lack in monitoring system towards former participants of the correctional program (Khalil, Brown, Chant, Otowo and Wood, 2019).

Recidivism is defined in this paper as: "if a person commits a criminal offence and for that, he was sentenced, but within a certain period of time, that is, after the crime has been carried out in whole or in part; or since the criminal has been completely abolished; or if the obligation to carry out the crime has not expired; the same offender then commits another crime (Nathan, James, 2015, Castillo, Ruben, 2004).

2. METHODOLOGY

In this study, the authors used secondary data from reports of preaching empowerment and entrepreneurship activities for former convicted terrorists 2013-2015 and terrorism convicts in 2016-2017 conducted by the Police Science and Terrorism Studies Research Center, School of Strategic and Global Studies, Universitas Indonesia. Next, the author conducted an in-depth interview with the Director of Deradicalization of the BNPT, Director General of Corrections, Director of Identification and Dissemination of Detachment 88 AT INP, Director of the Indonesian Peace Alliance (AIDA), Country Representative Search for Common Ground (SFCG), Founder Indonesian Institute for Society Empowerment INSEP), Program Manager for the Institute for International Peace Building (YPP). The interview takes about 30-90 minutes, do it and make the transcript. The time and location of the interview adjusted the willingness of the interviewees. Interviews take place from 2018-2019.

The author has a good relationship informally and formally with all the interviewees. The author since 2006 often partnered with Detachment 88 AT INP, in 2014-2016 had been a researcher at the BNPT Protection Directorate and had worked with the Directorate General of Corrections in the empowerment of preaching and the economy in 2016-2017. The author has a good relationship with CSOs who carry out the de-radicalization program.

To understand the de-radicalization that first needs to be understood is how individuals involved in terrorism are a process. The process starts from joining terror groups, carrying out acts of terror, engaging in acts of terror, or eventually leaving or no longer involved in terrorism (Horgan, 2008, Horgan and Altier, 2012), change in behaviour or a person's activity is no longer commit violence and leave the radical group (Bertjan, 2015) with various methods are carried out by the government and also the community through a multidisciplinary approach (Ferguson, 2016). Another expert said deradicalization is defined as part of the perspective of the program's social identity with real success. Those who provide opportunities for reducing threats, equalizing status and increasing choices for social conditions needed for intergroup relations (Horgan and Baddock, 2010).

Harmoniously whereas Hoffman argues that the scope of de-radicalization lies in terror activities carried out with religious motivation or encouragement (Hoffman, 2009). Deradicalization is important to identify individuals who have been radicalized and to do the right treatment that requires special expertise. This activity aims to increase public awareness, resilience, or coherence (Koehler and Feibig, 2019). Koehler also suggested secondary and tertiary prevention aimed at preventing recidivism against extreme violence or other risk factors in the future.

Indonesia's National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) defines deradicalization as all efforts to transform radical beliefs or ideologies into non-radical with a multi-and interdisciplinary approach through programs of identification, rehabilitation, re-education and socialization for suspects, prisoners, former prisoners, and their families and networks radical indications by prioritizing the principles of empowerment, human rights, rule of law and equality. De-radicalization as a planned, integrated, systematic and continuous process that eliminates or reduces and reverses the radical understanding of terrorism that has occurred. Deradicalization is carried out through fostering national insight; fostering religious insight; and/or entrepreneurship (BNPT, 2014).

As stated in the earlier part of this paper, the phenomenon of recidivism is not merely a recurring issue of terrorism, but these phenomena have shown that the de-radicalization program has not been effective in Indonesia. After discussing recidivism as an entry point, this paper will then discuss the problem of deradicalization itself. However, before discussing the issue of deradicalization. A number of studies and empirical data are presented to show the dynamics of deradicalization in Indonesia to date, and its comparison with other countries. Furthermore, deradicalization as a program will be an analysis using SWOT. In the end, several recommendations will be made regarding the deradicalization program itself in the Indonesian context.

SWOT analysis is a strategic work plan used in evaluating an organization, plan, and project or business activity. Therefore, SWOT Analysis is an important tool for analysis that helps managers of organizational and environmental factors. SWOT analysis has two dimensions: Internal and external. Internal dimensions include organizational factors, as well as strengths and weaknesses, external dimensions include environmental factors, as well as opportunities and defence (GÜREL, 2017, Wang, Zhang, & Yang, 2014, Woźniak & Fill, 2018). Selznick, Andrews, and Chandler stated that four reasons characterize SWOT, namely leadership strategies, autonomous organizations, organizations that have clear demarcations, and organizations are rational hierarchies (Van Wijngaarden, Scholten, & Van Wijk, 2012).

The Turkish government uses SWOT analysis to evaluate the Immigration Section in the context of illegal immigrants (Şahin, 2016). Evaluate government policies related to strengthening counterterrorism bureaucracy, and to build systems that strengthen centralized leadership, by discussing a broad "whole" to overcome terrorism, separatism, and extremism (Tanner & Bellacqua, 2016).

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Until now, according to the author, there is no writing that can explain the implementation of the deradicalization program in Indonesia in full. Through this research, the author tries to explain the implementation of deradicalization in Indonesia as completely as possible based on the experience of the authors included in this study. Deradicalization in Indonesia, according to the author, can be divided into three stages, namely the first stage during the Pre-Correctional Institution or where terrorists are caught, the investigation process, the trial process. The second stage at the Correctional Institution, this stage is that the perpetrators of terror have permanent legal force to serve a sentence in the Correctional Institution. The third stage is the Post Correctional Institution. The implementation of the deradicalization program in Indonesia can be seen in the following table.

Table 1. Deradicalization Program in Indonesia

| Institution | Deradicalization Program and Method | Stage |
|--|--|---|
| Detachment 88 INP (Juana J, 2018) | Individual Approach, Basic Needs Approach (economic), Family Approach | Pre- Prison, In Prison, Post Prison |
| NCTA (BNPT) (Idris, 2019) | Group Approach, Religion Approach, National Identity Approach and Economic Empowerment by entrepreneurship | In Prison especially in Deradicalization Center in BNPT and Post Prison |
| Correctional Institution (Ditjenpas) (Utami, 2018) | Assessment, Placement and Personal Approach | In Prison |
| AIDA (Satrawi, 2018) | Restorative Justice | In Prison and Post Prison |

| | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| INSEP (Mufid, 2018) | As Resources Person in Religion Approach | In Prison and Post Prison |
| SFCG (Wicaksana, 2018) | Conflict Management Training and Life Management Training | In Prison and Post Prison |
| YPP (Rizki, 2018) | Personal Approach, Economic Approach | In Prison and Post Prison |
| PRIK KT UI (Sarwono et. All, 2017) | Empowering in Preaching and Entrepreneurship: Psychology Approach (tolerance, empathy and counselling), Religion Approach, Economic Approach, Individual Approach, Group Approach | In Prison and Post Prison |

Sources: from In-Depth Interviews with Deradicalization Stakeholders in Indonesia

3.1 Comment from Perpetrator

What was conveyed by the Director of Idensos Detachment 88 AT the Indonesia National Police in accordance with the recognition of one of the former convicts of terrorism? According to him the initial process of realizing his mistake was when in the detention of the Special Detachment 88 AT INP after being caught, he was visited by a member of the Special Detachment 88 AT INP who asked who you were fighting for if fighting for Islam did the name of Islam become good or bad after doing what you fought for. These questions make the perpetrators flinch and think, conveying finally realize that the struggle they are doing is wrong because it makes the name of Islam ugly. Furthermore, the perpetrators write a book about the story of their life experiences that can provide benefits to the community (Setyawan, 2019).

3.2 Obstacle Deradicalization Program in Indonesia

In accordance with applicable law, the Penitentiary should have identified detainees, including detainees in terrorism cases. However, in reality, it was only seen in 2019 after the Correctional Revitalization Program planned by the Director-General of Corrections. Identifications made by the Correctional Institution still experience various obstacles including the Directorate General of Corrections (Bapas) do not have a standard and appropriate instrument to identify prisoners of terrorism cases, correctional centres do not yet have and get preliminary data from detainees of terrorism cases to be identified and the knowledge of community counsellors (PK) about terrorism that occurred in Indonesia is very lacking (Putu, 2019).

Program Manager of the Institute for International Peace Building (YPP) explained that one of his weaknesses in the implementation of deradicalization is that BNPT tends to monopolize deradicalization, even though there is a lack of human resources in BNPT to covering terrorist inmate or ex-terrorist inmate throughout Indonesia. YPP stated that it did not cooperate with BNPT in implementing deradicalization (Rizki, 2018).

An advisor to PPIM Jakarta State Islamic University said that deradicalization must be a long-term program, carried out by building community resilience, such as education. There

should be no injustice that arises anger which leads to acts of terror. Books in Islamic Education Institutions need to be looked back on and reviewed. Religious teachers need to be attentive to the issues (Jamhari, 2018).

Until now ex-convicts of terrorism by government agencies and non-governmental institutions are ex-convicts of terrorism who are not members of the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) or affiliated with ISIS. Whereas ex-convicts who are still affiliated with ISIS, their tendency is not to relate and participate in activities carried out by the government and non-government institutions. This is because they still consider people who are not members of their group to be enemies and their groups are still financially supportive.

3.3 Discussion

To prevent an increase in terrorist recidivism in Indonesia, a SWOT analysis is needed to find out the strengths and weaknesses of Indonesia in carrying out de-radicalization. In addition to knowing the opportunities and threats that will be faced by Indonesia in the future.

Based on the results of data collection conducted by researchers through secondary data and primary data in-depth interviews with implementers of de-radicalization from the government and government institutions, then the authors conducted a SWOT analysis. The SWOT analysis results can be seen in the table below.

Table 2. SWOT Analysis Deradicalization Program in Indonesia

| | |
|----------|---|
| Strength | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Law No. 5 of 2018 concerning Handling of Terrorism 2. Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning Prevention of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges, and Correctional Officers. 3. Government agencies and non-government institutions participate in carrying out de-radicalization. 4. The majority of Indonesians reject violent acts of extremism and terrorism 5. Multiple methods: Individual and Group approach, Religious approach, Psychological approach, Economic approach, Family approach, Basic needs approach, National identity approach, Peacebuilding approach. |
| Weakness | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Coordination among de-radicalization implementers is not yet optimal, because there is still a sectoral ego tendency 2. There are no rules regarding the terms of competence for implementing de-radicalization 3. There is no standard method in implementing de-radicalization and is only oriented towards Muslim practitioners 4. There is no standard instrument to determine the categorization of terrorists 5. There are no standard parameters to determine the successful implementation of deradicalization 6. There are still people who refuse ex-convicts to return to their homes |

| | |
|-------------|---|
| Opportunity | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Many countries want to cooperate and assist Indonesia in dealing with terrorism 2. Research on deradicalization has been carried out by researchers outside Indonesia 3. ISIS has been destroyed and its leader has died |
| Threats | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Globalization 2. Development of information technology 3. Discrimination 4. Human Rights Violations |

Source: Author analysis from in-depth interviews

Based on the SWOT analysis that has been carried out it appears that indeed in the implementation of de-radicalization Indonesia still has weaknesses that have the potential to increase the number of recidivists of terrorism. In addition, global threats are still a serious threat. 600s of ex-ISIS citizens who were still in refugee camps in Syria became a big problem for the Government of Indonesia. In law, Indonesia does not yet have strict rules regarding citizens involved in terrorist groups so there is no reason to refuse them to return to Indonesia. On the other hand, if 600 Indonesian ex-ISIS citizens returned to Indonesia, it was feared that it would become a time bomb that would explode at any time.

Lack of systematic coordination between various relevant government agencies, limited contact and collaboration between government and non-government actors, and lack of community involvement so far in the process of ex-reintegration - the cause of recidivism (Hiariej et al., 2017) This is consistent with what was found by Sumpter that the de-radicalization undertaken by the Government of Indonesia was seen as lacking in preventing recidivism. The Indonesian government requires variations on a soft approach so that ex-terrorist convicts do not become recidivists. Collaboration among stakeholders will make the reintegration process of terrorism prisoners back to the community effective. This is in accordance with the 2014 UN a report, which a multi-disciplinary approach needs to be taken by the government involving CSOs, companies. NGOs, families, and communities (Sumpter, Wardhani, & Priyanto, 2019).

According to Benedict Wilkinson, MAAPA has "been quite successful in preventing supporters of terrorism from becoming recidivists" in the UK, but it has not been done in conjunction with relief efforts. This strategy looks good in its implementation, not easy because of the lack of human resources, planning and ongoing evaluation. The Second BNPT against its post-release deradicalization strategy is an event held for former cooperative prisoners of terrorism designed to encourage the re-establishment of their commitment to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Sumpter et al., 2019)

Besides, terrorist recidivists in Indonesia occur because in fact ex-convicts of terrorism even though they have said they no longer join the group, but many are still interacting with their ex-group friends. The relationship is due to marriage, friendship, and family ties, making it difficult to break all ties. In other words, the research conducted by Hwang found no evidence that separate jihadists felt the need to cut ties with their old friends (Hwang, 2017). Why do ex-

convicts of terrorism in Indonesia continue to make contact with their former groups, according to the authors of this case because in the understanding of Islam that people who break the relationship will not smell until heaven. This is what makes the relationship continue until whenever, even if it is only in greetings or friendship.

Recidivist terrorism can also be caused by the social stigma that is still a problem of former perpetrators to succeed again in their communities. Lack of Basic Needs such as clothing, housing, and food also helps the cycle of recidivism. The key to success in preventing recidivism is having positive community ties and connections (Paulson, 2013)

The recidivism rates of terrorists are higher than ordinary offenders but follow the same pattern: the length and age of sentence on release reduce the risk of recidivism, while affiliation with terrorist organizations significantly increases it. For repeat offenders, recidivism to new terrorism offences increases with the number of detentions related to previous terrorism and decreases with the number of additional detention for ordinary criminal offences. While marital status influences the recidivism of the person who first enters, it has no significant effect on repeat offenders. The effect of this type of offence for previous detention was similar in the two analyzes. (Hasisi et al., 2019)

Prolonged unresolved conflict, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all forms and manifestations, lack of rule of law, violations of human rights, ethnicity, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance are factors causing terrorist recidivism in Europe (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2014).

In his research, Hwang found that disengagement, in the case of Indonesia, was driven by a combination of psychological, emotional, relational, and strategic factors. The four main factors are disappointment with the tactics and movement leaders; the awareness that the costs of continuing actions outweigh the potential personal or organizational benefits; building new relationships with individuals outside the circle of jihad, and set personal and professional priorities. In some circumstances, pressure from the comparison and humane treatment of the authorities plays a supporting role (Hwang, 2017, Khalil et al., 2019). Whereas Hasisi in his research on terrorist recidivism in Palestine found that marriage and economic assistance to former terrorists could prevent him from becoming recidivism (Hasisi et al., 2019)

4. CONCLUSION

Weaknesses and threats in implementing de-radicalization in Indonesia must be eliminated so that terrorist recidivism does not happen again. Weaknesses in coordination issues between government and non-government institutions implementing de-radicalization can be done in collaboration. This is following Scott London's opinion that collaboration is not limited by a certain time or period, as long as there are matters that have contact or slices with other parties, collaboration is still needed. Collaboration involves several parties starting from the level of individuals, workgroups, and organizations. In carrying out collaborations it is very important to understand the performance of public institutions. While Carpenter explained that, collaboration has 5 characteristics, namely: 1. Joint leadership and decision making 2.

Collaborative Inquiry 3. Sharing Practices 4. Accountability for results 5. Developing relationships. This is consistent with Hiariej's recommendation to overcome violent extremism as a problem that requires collective action (Hiariej et al., 2017).

Weaknesses there are no rules regarding the terms of competence for implementing de-radicalization. This is also to prevent the implementers of the de-radicalization from being recruited by terrorists as happened to Kerobokan Denpasar Bali Penitentiary staff and Palembang South Sumatra Penitentiary Staff. This is under recommendations from research conducted by Istiqomah that the need for reform of the penal system and administrative policies to design a global strategy against terrorism in correctional institutions. One of them is by increasing the quality and quantity of correctional resources (Istiqomah, 2011). Weaknesses do not yet have a standard method in the implementation of de-radicalization and are only oriented towards Muslim practitioners. It is better to immediately formulate and establish a method of deradicalization that does not discriminate against certain groups, groups, and religions because terrorists in Indonesia are not only Muslims but there are also non-Muslims. Weaknesses in the absence of a standard instrument to determine the categorization of terrorists and standard parameters to determine the successful implementation of de-radicalization must be made immediately by involving academics and experts, in order to produce an instrument and parameters in accordance with the characteristics of terrorists in Indonesia.

There are still people who refuse ex-convicts to return to their homes, this can be done by involving the community early on (Correctional Institution) in the implementation of de-radicalization so that when ex-convicts of terrorism want to return to live in society, the community has understood and accepted. Threats from outside Indonesia that can result in the emergence of terrorist recidivism can be prevented by increasing international cooperation with countries that have potential. Also, updates on information about conflict issues that occur abroad become very important in preventing acts of terrorism that will occur in Indonesia in response to the groups or relations that are victims abroad.

Prevention of recidivism can be done by increasing the skills of former offenders, knowledge, and motivation to access the labour market, increasing other similar efforts by other institutions to release this group from violent extremism, the idea of involving broader stakeholders and related communities in dealing with problems this is a strategic thing (Hiariej et al., 2017). This paper shows that indeed de-radicalization needs to be evaluated in Indonesia. The results of the discussion will soon be followed up into a policy that can bring together de-radicalization implementers in Indonesia. The awareness that deradicalization can only be carried out well if there are a vision and mission of the implementers of de-radicalization becomes very important. Good collaboration from the implementers of deradicalization in Indonesia makes it possible to prevent the emergence of terrorist recidivism.

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Interview with:

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Director Identification and Socialization of Detachment 88 INP
Director of Deradicalization BNPT.
Director of Indonesia Peace Alliance
Director-General of Correctional Institution
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